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THE FCC’S BROADCAST NEWS DISTORTION RULES: REGULATION BY DROOPING EYELID
CHAD RAPHAEL*
During the deregulatory era that began in the 1980s, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) appears to have lifted all content-based regulations from broadcast news.
The FCC removed requirements that licensees formally ascertain their communities’ needs and
provide appropriate news and public affairs, maintain production guidelines for news, and offer
some minimum level of public affairs programming.1 In 1987, the Commission partially
repealed the Fairness Doctrine, which had required stations to afford “reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of conflicting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.”2 In
2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down the FCC’s personal
attack rule, which directed stations to notify and offer reply time to the targets of character
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1
Deregulation of Radio (Part 1 of 2), Report and Order (Proceeding Terminated), 84
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981), recons., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981), aff'd
in part and remanded in part, Office of Comm. of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 803
(D.C. Cir., 1990); Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Report and
Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984), recons., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 358
(1986), aff'd in part and remanded in part, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir., 1987).
2
Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 1041 (1964). The Doctrine was partially revoked in Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987); aff’d Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C., 867 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir., 1989).

attacks during discussions of controversial public issues on the air, and the Commission’s
political editorializing rule, which required a licensee to offer response time to legally qualified
political candidates when it opposed their candidacy or endorsed their opponent on air.3 Even
the relaxation of non-content regulations, such as the extension of stations' license terms from
three to eight years,4 and adoption of rules that make challenges to license renewals by the public
or potential competitors almost impossible,5 have bolstered broadcasters' editorial rights against
outside review.
Given this deregulatory trend, it is remarkable that the Commission has preserved its
little-known rules against licensees’ deliberately distorting the news. Defined more fully below,
these rules prohibit deliberate staging, slanting, and falsifying of news, as well as promotion or
suppression of news to serve the licensees’ private interests rather than the public interest.
Indeed, the FCC has twice reaffirmed its commitment to its distortion policy in this period,
declaring in 1986 that since news distortion “goes to the essence of the trust placed in a
broadcaster to provide quality service oriented to the needs of its community . . . news staging
and news distortion should continue to be treated as ‘adverse reflections on an applicant's
qualifications to serve the public interest.’”6
The distortion rules have drawn scant commentary in the regulatory literature, especially
in contrast to the outpouring of debate over their cousin, the Fairness Doctrine. Brief treatments
of the rules have noted that they form a narrow exception to the FCC’s general policy of
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See Radio-Television News Directors Assn. v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir., 2000).
See 47 C.F.R. 73.1020 (2000).
5
See Implementation of Sections 204(a) and 204(c) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (Broadcast License Renewal Procedures), 61 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (Apr. 12, 1996) (amending
47 U.S.C. § 309(k)).
4

2

avoiding intervention in licensees’ editorial judgments7, and have discussed the Commission’s
high evidentiary standard for proving distortion, either expressing concern about the barrier it
erects to FCC inquiry8, or praising it as a bulwark against the chilling effect on news that
frequent Commission probes might create.9 In the fullest discussion of how the rules have been
applied, former FCC Chief of Broadcast Complaints and Compliance William Ray has reviewed
some of the distortion cases decided during his tenure at the Commission in the 1960s and 1970s,
criticizing the FCC for failing to enforce its rules against broadcasters.10 Nor has there been
much judicial review and commentary upon the distortion policy. In 1985, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals upheld it, commenting that the “Commission's practice . . .
has given its policy against news distortion an extremely limited scope,”11 but declining to
override Congress’ and the Commission’s powers over this area of broadcast regulation. In a
more recent decision, discussed below, the Court of Appeals vacated the Commission’s dismissal
of a distortion complaint, raising questions about the FCC’s commitment to enforcing its
policy.12
The specter of a regulatory agency closely overseeing the accuracy of broadcast news
poses serious First Amendment concerns, but, this article argues, the FCC has treated its
distortion policy as a form of symbolic regulation. The Commission’s recent inaction on

6

Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179,
1211-12 (1986). The FCC recently restated its commitment to this policy in Complaints About
Broadcast Journalism, 1999 FCC LEXIS 4302 (1999).
7
See Clay Calvert, Toxic Television, Editorial Discretion, & The Public Interest: A Rocky
Mountain Low, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 163, 199 (1998).
8
See Brian C. Murchison, Misrepresentation and the FCC, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 403, 450
(1985).
9
See Timothy B. Dyk & Ralph E. Goldberg, The First Amendment and Congressional
Investigations of Broadcast Programming, 3 J.L. & POL. 625, 662 (1987).
10
WILLIAM RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIO-TV REGULATION 3-31 (1990).
11
Galloway v. F.C.C., 778 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir., 1985).
3

distortion complaints suggests that it may be quietly orphaning a policy that could help deter
deceptive news techniques and mitigate growing conflicts between broadcasters’ journalistic and
economic interests. Part one offers a contemporary rationale for FCC oversight of news, despite
the deregulatory drift of the recent past and First Amendment issues. Part two explains relevant
concepts from the theory of symbolic regulation. Part three reviews the definition, origins and
codification of the distortion policy. Part four examines whether the distortion rules are
symbolic by offering the first systematic, quantitative study of FCC decisions in this area. Part
five goes deeper into the record, showing through illustrative cases how the Commission’s
evidentiary requirements, burden of proof, shifting definition of news, and sometimes arbitrary
reasoning impose a near-insurmountable burden on complainants. Part six offers prescriptions
for adjusting the policy so that it could be enforced more clearly and easily.
REGULATORY RATIONALE
Reinvigorating the news distortion rules would entail a recommitment to the public
interest in broadcast news. There are several reasons why it is still fair to exert public oversight
of broadcast news practices in the multi-channel world of cable television and radio, direct
broadcast satellite, and the internet. First, spectrum is still scarcer than those who would like to
use it, judging from the huge prices that broadcast licenses fetch in the marketplace, and the
growth of “pirate” or low-power radio stations that have sprung up to serve local interests in an
age of increasingly concentrated and distant ownership.13 Each time the Commission issues or
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Serafyn v. F.C.C., 149 F.3d 1213 (D.C. Cir., 1998).
In January 2000 the FCC set aside spectrum for 1000 new low-power radio stations to
be operated by non-profit groups, such as churches, schools and community organizations.
However, Congress drastically curtailed the new allotments in response to objections from the
National Association of Broadcasters and National Public Radio that the new stations risked
interfering with existing stations’ signals. The FCC attributed this resistance to attempts to stave
off competition from new entrants in the market. In December 2000 the Commission approved
13
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renews a license it is discriminating between speakers in the marketplace, and it retains an
obligation to consider which of them will serve the public interest best. The quality of
broadcasters’ news programming remains one of the most important criteria for making that
decision.
Second, broadcasters enjoy privileged access to the spectrum compared to other
commercial users of this public resource, and this preferential treatment grows less defensible in
the absence of public service expectations in return. At a time when telecommunications
companies pay millions at auction to rent the spectrum for their purposes, broadcasters do not
pay fees for using the frequencies given to them and have obtained free transitional frequencies
for digital television. The beneficiaries of this remarkably lucrative giveaway, to whom so much
of our public discourse has been entrusted, owe the givers responsible news and some public
accountability. The basic insight of legal realism still holds: government always acts, even
through apparent “inaction,” to construct markets and enable the speech of some at the expense
of others.14
Third, there are few other real checks on licensee power at present, as complainants have
small recourse to other regulatory measures. In the late 1960s, the Commission justified its
narrow application of the distortion policy in part by stating that it was preferable to use the
Fairness Doctrine to ensure that all points of view might be heard on disputed issues, rather than

255 of the initial 1200 applications, most in sparsely populated areas. See Stephen Labaton, 255
Licenses Are Awarded For Low-Power FM Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at C5.
14
For recent, and intriguingly different statements of legal realist positions on broadcast
regulation, compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)
(drawing on Madisonian and New Deal approaches to speech) and THOMAS STREETER, SELLING
THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES
(1996) (drawing on critical legal theory and cultural studies approaches).
5

for the Commission to decide who was right or wrong.15 With the demise of the Doctrine,
complainants may no longer have any leverage to respond to distorted news on the air. The
aggrieved may bring tort suits against broadcasters, but such civil suits cannot assess or
compensate the harm to the public interest of distorted news, nor can they address such practices
as shaping the news to serve the interests of broadcast owners and advertisers.
Fourth, as is shown in this article, the FCC’s own distortion rulings suggest that
broadcasters have not sufficiently regulated themselves. The Commission placed great faith in
broadcasters to investigate and discipline their employees for such transgressions, yet many of its
decisions reproach broadcasters for failing to probe allegations in good faith, and are often
accompanied by dissents urging stronger FCC sanction against licensees on these grounds. By
crafting the distortion rules in the late 1960s, the FCC helped spark CBS to create a set of news
standards and practices, and the other networks to follow, but CBS’ own top news executives at
the time later admitted that these standards were not assiduously followed.16 The development
of the networks’ standards fits the general rule that industry self-regulation is most likely to

15

“[O]verlaying this entire area is the fairness doctrine, which is applicable to the news
operation of broadcast licensees and which, in particular situations such as here treated, may call
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.” Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151
(1969). See also Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969) (contrasting potential government
censorship in distortion cases with the Fairness Doctrine).
16
Former CBS News President Richard S. Salant attributed the codification of the
network’s news standards to FCC pressure. Former CBS Vice President of News, Gordon
Manning, has said that the standards were generally ignored by his journalists, and its former
Vice President of Political Coverage and Documentaries, Bill Leonard, has said that they were
“honored with a wink as with an observance.” SALANT, CBS, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF
BROADCAST JOURNALISM: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD S. SALANT 8, 176 (Susan & Bill
Buzenberg, eds., 1999).
6

come in response to credible government threats to regulate, and that without that threat, selfregulation is unlikely to meet its purported goals.17
Most importantly, as the economics of broadcast journalism have changed news has
become less political speech or public service offering and more commercial speech, which is
less deserving of full First Amendment protection. In the late 1960s, the Commission justified
its reluctance to intervene in distortion cases largely because doing so “might tend to discourage
broadcast journalism, and might thus be at odds with the very reason for our allocation of so
much scarce spectrum space to broadcasting -- our realization of the valuable contribution it can
make to an informed electorate.”18 Today, particularly in television, news is no longer a moneylosing public interest obligation, but a profit center, as evidenced by the spread of all news cable
channels, local broadcast news, and network prime-time newsmagazines and “reality-based”
programming.19 As the topics and production techniques of news and entertainment
programming have become less distinguishable, television journalism’s standards of
newsgathering and reporting are widely perceived as in decline.20 Newscasters increasingly
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See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM L.J. 711, 758.
The failure of the National News Council, which from 1973 to 1984 attempted to provide a
review board for public complaints of unfairness and inaccuracy against print and broadcast
media, illustrates the tendency of such efforts to wither once the potential for regulation recedes.
The Council, made up of public and media representatives, was created in response to growing
criticism and investigation of the media in the early 1970s by Congress and the Executive
Branch. Resistance from major media organizations, and a lack of funding and public attention
eventually doomed the Council. See generally PATRICK BROGAN, SPIKED: THE SHORT LIFE AND
DEATH OF THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL (1985).
18
Network Coverage of Democratic National Convention (Letter to ABC, et al.), 16
F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969).
19
See Chad Raphael, The Political Economy of Reali-TV 41 JUMP CUT 102 (1997).
20
See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED
MEDIA 3-8, 48, 73-74 (1999) (discussing how infotainment has lowered journalistic standards
and Americans respect for journalism); see also Ellen Hume, The New Paradigm for News,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 1996, at 141, 144 (discussing tabloid television’s
influence on evening news.)
7

ignore much of the political process, especially at the state and local levels, failing to serve the
informational needs of their communities.21 As Clay Calvert has argued, the FCC continues to
provide
a huge [First Amendment] exemption to broadcasters who choose to label a program as news, even though
its primary function is to ‘attract and hold an audience and avoid offending advertisers, audiences, and
media owners’ and its value for informing and facilitating democratic self-governance may be marginal.
Our standards of what constitutes news have certainly shifted over the years, yet the FCC clings to the
notion that a clear dichotomy between news and non-news programming can be maintained . . . As
entertainment values swallow up traditional news judgments and a world of infotainment emerges, perhaps
it is time to treat all broadcast fare under the same standards rather than carving out a realm of heightened
22
protection for broadcast programs that are dubbed news by a network or local television executive.

In an age of market-driven news, a renewed distortion policy could check deception in service to
sensationalism and lessen advertiser influence on journalism.23 In an era of conglomerate
ownership of the major television networks and dramatically increasing concentration of radio

21

See Tom Rosenstiel, et al, Quality Brings Higher Ratings, But Enterprise is
Disappearing (1998), available at http://www.journalism.org/publ_research/special_rep.html
(content analysis by Project for Excellence in Journalism, affiliated with the Columbia
University Graduate School of Journalism, finds drop in original, or “enterprise,” reporting at
local television news stations); Committee of Concerned Journalists, Changing Definitions Of
News (1998), available at http://www.journalism.org/ccj/resources/chdefonews.html (content
analysis finds shift toward lifestyle, celebrity, entertainment and crime/scandal, and away from
government and foreign affairs; network news magazines have all but abandoned government,
social welfare, education and economics in favor of lifestyle news and news-you-can-use);
Rocky Mountain Media Watch, 98 Election Survey (1998), available at
http://www.bigmedia.org/elect98.html (content analysis of evening newscasts from 25 states two
weeks before election day reveals four times as many political ads as election news stories); Jill
Geisler, Blacked Out, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 2000, at 34 (reporting results of nationwide
studies of local television news showing low levels of local political coverage).
22
Calvert, supra note 7, at 193 (footnotes omitted).
23
See Lawrence Soley, The Power of the Press Has A Price, EXTRA!, July 1997, at 11
(survey of broadcast investigative reporters in which over 40% of journalists admitted that
advertisers had recently succeeded in influencing a news report). See also Institute for
Alternative Journalism, Bottom Line vs. Top Story: The Synergy Report (1997), available at
http://www.independentmedia.org/congress/synergy.html (numerous examples of advertiser
intervention in news); see also Neil Hickey, Money Lust: How Pressure for Profit is Perverting
Journalism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jul.-Aug. 1998, at 28 (additional examples of advertiser
pressures).
8

station ownership,24 such a policy might check the suppression and promotion of stories to serve
licensees’ farflung business interests.25 Each of these interventions would enlarge the scope of
broadcast speech, rather than curtail it, posing no undue burden on broadcasters’ speech rights
and offering significant benefits to the public right to receive information.
SYMBOLIC REGULATION
In the U.S., most content-based broadcast regulations ultimately derive from licensees’
primary formal obligation to serve the “public interest, convenience and necessity.”26 Yet, as
Murray Edelman’s theory of symbolic regulation maintains, laws and policies that purport to
protect the public interest can be repealed in effect by administrative neglect, industry
recalcitrance, Congressional and Executive Branch pressure, and budget starvation. However,
Edelman argues that “the laws as symbols must stand because they satisfy interests that are very
strong indeed: interests that politicians fear will be expressed actively if a large number of voters
are led to believe that their shield against a threat has been removed.”27 If regulators repeatedly
fail to apply rules in ways that challenge the industry, that failure must be managed carefully in

24

See Michael J. Aguilar, Note: Micro Radio: A Small Step in the Return to Localism,
Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 1133, 1163-66 (1999).
25
See Steve Weinberg, Smoking Guns: ABC, Philip Morris and the Infamous Apology,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 29 (discussing ABC-Capital Cities management
pressure on journalists to apologize for report critical of tobacco company to avoid libel lawsuit
during sale of company to Disney). See also Clay Calvert, Stumbling Down Tobacco Road:
Media Self-Censorship And Corporate Capitulation In The War On The Cigarette Industry, 30
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L. REV. 139 (1996) (on CBS executives’ pressure on journalists to
suppress report critical of tobacco to avoid feared suit for tortious interference during sale of the
company to Westinghouse, and simultaneous acquisition of six tobacco brands); Jim Naureckas,
Corporate Ownership Matters: The Case of NBC, EXTRA!, Nov. 1995, at 13 (offering examples
of parent company General Electric’s interventions in NBC News editorial decision making to
defend GE’s image); Lawrie Mifflin, An ABC News Reporter Tests the Boundaries of
Investigating Disney and Finds Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at C8 (discussing corporate
pressure on ABC investigative reporter to alter story on pedophiles working at parent company’s
Disney World); Institute for Alternative Journalism, supra note 23; Hickey, supra note 23.
26
47 U.S.C. § 309 (a) (2000).
9

policy discourse. FCC decisions often “give the rhetoric to one side and the decision to the
other,”28 affirming abstractions such as the “public interest” in vague and hortatory language that
assures all involved that citizens' needs have been duly considered in decision making, and that
broadcasters must serve them, before clearing the licensee of wrongdoing or applying a
regulatory tap on the wrist. If the symbolic aspects of policymaking are rarely acknowledged
openly, they play no small part in legitimizing the process.
Similarly, Thomas Streeter has noted how the FCC's long-term inclination to protect
broadcasters’ claims to the spectrum against competition29 and enlarge their First Amendment
rights at the expense of public accountability30 must be cast in the discourse of neutral principles
and technical expertise to establish rhetorical distance from industry influence.31 Indeed, when
the Commission has failed to do so, its critics in the judiciary and even in its own house have
sometimes decried the symbolic nature of its oversight.32 If FCC policy decisions are to be
accepted by the regulators and the regulated, they must appear disinterested. Policy talk, like
news, relies on a myth of expert objectivity. This is not to say that all broadcast regulators have
been engaged in a conscious conspiracy against the public. As Streeter argues, the discursive

27

MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 37 (1976).
Id. at 39.
29
For a recent review of the supporting literature on this point, which has become too
voluminous to cite in its entirety, see Charles R. Shipan, Keeping Competitors Out: Broadcast
Regulation from 1927 to 1996, in A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 473-498 (Roger E. Noll &
Monroe E. Price eds., 1998).
30
See generally Monroe E. Price, Speech, Structure, and Technology, 2 CARDOZO STUD.
IN L. & LITERATURE 113 (1990).
31
STREETER, supra note 14, at 191–93 (1996).
32
For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals warned the FCC against its “curious
neutrality in favor of the licensee” when assigning the burden of proof to complainants and
resolving conflicting evidence in favor of the licensee, in Office of Communications of United
Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Commissioner Nicholas
Johnson repeated the phrase in a 1973 dissent involving news distortion charges, deriding the
28
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rules of the policy community themselves come to exert influence over what options can be put
forth as “practical” and “realistic,” militating against overt commitments to political-economic
interests, actors and ideologies as the basis for rulemaking.33 This discursive need to transcend
particular interests can occasionally open up space for aberrant decisions that challenge industry
prerogatives. Once the for-profit, commercially-supported, government-licensed nature of the
system is taken as a given, commitments to the public interest and regulatory disinterest
sometimes limit what the industry can win from the regulatory apparatus. In addition, even
symbolic regulations may exert some small checks on industry by presenting the threat of
government intervention, as the Fairness Doctrine sometimes did by giving broadcasting’s critics
some leverage to negotiate informally for response time.34
The theory of symbolic regulation would apply when regulators preserve and maintain
the appearance of applying a rule that purports to protect the public interest, while avoiding
enforcing the rule in such a way as to challenge the industry practices it was meant to address.
How might one evaluate evidence of such a theory in a falsifiable manner? Disconfirming
evidence would include the abolition of the rule, or its consistent enforcement. Since the
Commission’s prohibition of distortion is clearly still on the books, the question turns on the
rule’s application. If the distortion rules are symbolic, we would expect to see some
investigative activity by the Commission in such cases, but few findings against broadcasters,
light penalties, and a lack of fit between the pattern of enforcement and the policy’s stated goals.

FCC for turning the license renewal process into a wasteful “ritual” in which “the result was
preordained a long time ago.” Chronicle Broadcasting, 40 F.C.C.2d 775, 838 (1973).
33
STREETER, supra note 14, at 121, 123.
11

DEFINING NEWS DISTORTION
In 1949, the FCC expressed its concern for deceptive news in broad terms, stating that
The basis for any fair consideration of public issues, and particularly those of a controversial nature, is the
presentation of news and information concerning the basic facts of the controversy in as complete and
impartial a manner as possible. A licensee would be abusing his position as public trustee of these
important means of mass communications were he to withhold from expression over his facilities relevant
35
news or facts concerning a controversy or to slant or distort the presentation of such news.

Thus, the Commission initially justified its need to regulate in this area as ensuring the
conditions for freewheeling coverage of public affairs, and the contribution it could make to
citizen self-governance. Indeed, the Commission wrote that “the very reason for our allocation
of so much scarce spectrum space to broadcasting [was] our realization of the valuable
contribution it can make to an informed electorate.”36
However, it was not until a series of 1969-1973 decisions that the Commission began to
formalize its definition of distortion. The FCC did not do so on its own initiative, but in response
to Congressional pressure. Congressional committees and figures investigated a number of
distortion claims, and referred their complaints to the Commission in each of these precedent
cases.37 In refining its policy, the FCC asserted the gravity of the offense as “a most heinous act

34

See FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS 71 (1984).
The threat of regulation must be credible if it is to affect informal practice, as it must be to affect
self-regulation.
35
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See also
KMPC, Station of the Stars, Inc., 14 Fed. Reg. 4831 (1949) (establishing that a licensee’s
direction to news personnel to slant the news would raise serious questions about the character
qualifications of the licensee).
36
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). See
also Selling of the Pentagon, 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 153 (1971).
37
The cases included Network Coverage of Democratic National Convention (Letter to
ABC), 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969) (finding no staging of coverage of demonstrations outside the
1968 Chicago convention, in response to complaints filed by numerous Congresspeople and
others); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (WBBM), 18 F.C.C.2d 124 (1969) (finding no
staging of a pot party for a report on marijuana use by college students, in response to complaints
filed by Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce and others); Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143 (1969) (finding no deliberate
12

against the public interest -- indeed, there is no act more harmful to the public's ability to handle
its affairs. In all cases where we may appropriately do so, we shall act to protect the public
interest in this important respect.”38 Although the Commission resolutely promised to defend the
public interest against distortion, it also raised its countervailing commitment to broadcasters’
freedom of speech, and pledged not to chill it. “But in this democracy, no Government agency
can authenticate the news, or should try to do so. We will therefore eschew the censor's role,
including efforts to establish news distortion in situations where Government intervention would
constitute a worse danger than the possible rigging itself.”39 Thus, in cautioning that it would not
be “the national arbiter of the truth,”40 the FCC also bid to maintain its discursive neutrality.
The Commission has never laid out a concise statement of what constitutes distortion, but
it is possible to fashion a four-part test from its precedent decisions and subsequent actions. In
the absence of any of the four elements, the Commission has been unwilling to find distortion, or
even to investigate a complaint. First, there must be accusation of deliberate intent to distort the
news or mislead the audience. Audience complaints of inaccuracy or disagreement with the
broadcaster’s legitimate editorial choices are not enough to trigger FCC scrutiny. 41 Second,
distortion must be supported by evidence extrinsic to the broadcast itself. Otherwise, the FCC

deception in misreporting a baby’s cause of death as malnutrition, in response to complaints filed
by the House Subcommittee on Appropriations and Congressman Henry Gonzalez); Selling of
the Pentagon, 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971). (finding no deliberate distortion in editing military
interviewees’ remarks, in response to complaints filed by chairmen of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce and House Committee on Armed Services); and Hon. Harley
O. Staggers, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 413 (1972) (pledging to investigate CBS for inadequate
investigations into charges of news staging, in response to a complaint filed by the chairman of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
38
Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 150-51. See also Hon. Harley O. Staggers, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 413, 414
(1972); Letter to ABC, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 656 (1969).
13

will not inquire into "a dispute as to the truth of the event (i.e., a claim that the true facts of the
incident are different from those presented).”42 Extrinsic evidence might include testimony that
"a newsman had been given a bribe, or had offered one to procure some action or statement"; 43
material such as an outtake or memorandum that clearly showed intentional deception; or
testimony from a reporter that s/he was instructed by the owner, manager, or news director of a
station to invent or distort a news item.44 It may also include “testimony in writing or otherwise,
from ‘insiders’ or persons who have direct personal knowledge of an intentional attempt to
falsify the news.”45 Without such evidence, the FCC will not “enter the quagmire of
investigating the credibility of the newsman and the interviewed party,”46 which it sees as
matters best left to the licensee to investigate. Third, this evidence must show that the distortion
was initiated by or known to the licensee or to “its principals, top management, or news
management.”47 Fourth, distortion must involve a significant event, rather than an incidental part
of the news. The FCC will not inquire into “inaccurate embellishments concerning peripheral
aspects [of reports or] attempts at window dressing which concerned the manner of presenting
the news [when] the essential facts of the news stories to which these presentational devices
related were broadcast in an accurate manner.”48 In short, “the real criterion . . . is whether the
public is deceived about a matter of significance.”49

42

Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150-51 (1969).
Id. at 151.
44
See Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969); see also Letter to ABC, 16
F.C.C.2d 650, 657 (1969).
45
Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591, 592 (1969).
46
Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
47
Id. at 150.
48
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Over the years, the FCC has come to apply this four-part test to a wide range of forms of
distortion, including staging (or rigging), slanting, falsification, deception (or misrepresentation),
and suppression. In defining impermissible staging, the FCC declared that it would not
investigate charges that involved “filming of conduct engaged in because of the knowledge that
the cameras are there,”50 such as occurred in press conferences or demonstrations, since these
activities were not directly under journalists' control. Nor would it investigate “scenes in a
documentary which obviously involve such 'staging' as camera direction, lights, action
instructions, etc.”51 Instead, the Commission would limit its inquiries to cases in which “a
licensee has staged or culpably distorted the presentation of a news event,”52 where staging
consisted of “a purportedly significant 'event' which did not in fact occur but rather is 'acted out'
at the behest of news personnel.”53
The FCC has not attempted any comparably clear definition of falsification, deception or
slanting in relation to news. In practice, the Commission seems to use falsification to refer to
any fabrication of facts, such as making up weather readings without checking actual
temperatures.54 Deception (or misrepresentation) seems to consist of misleading the public about
the source of information, such as presenting questions and suggestions written by news staff as
if they were posed by viewers, or scripting purportedly spontaneous questions from a studio
audience.55 It may involve “editing of a taped or filmed interview for the purpose of
misrepresenting the views of the person interviewed, and deliberate exclusion of certain aspects
of a news event, not because they are deemed lacking in news value, but for the purpose of
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misrepresenting the event.”56 Deception may also be found in the packaging of news, including
misrepresenting journalists as reporting from the scene of an event, using old video to illustrate
current events without disclosure, or misrepresenting the true location shown in video.57 By
slanting, the Commission seems to mean the use of deliberate inaccuracy to favor one viewpoint,
or disfavor another, on a matter of public significance.58 Slanting can also refer to the systematic
promotion or suppression of stories or viewpoints to serve the licensee’s ideological views or
business interests.59 The Commission has investigated promotion in cases involving a licensee
who directed reporters to mention a Senate candidate positively in each newscast during his
campaign in exchange for regulatory favors,60 and allegations that station management instructed
news staff to increase positive coverage of cities where its parent company was seeking cable
television licenses.61 Suppression is exemplified by a licensee who told news staff to stop
coverage of a local tennis tournament because the country club that sponsored it was in arrears
on its advertising bill with the station,62 and another owner instructing news personnel at his
stations to present no favorable news about the late President Roosevelt and his family, or about
Jews, and to make no negative mention of the Ku Klux Klan.63 In slanting cases, complainants
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must present evidence that the licensee’s political views or business interests shaped the news,
rather than journalistic judgments of whether material was newsworthy.64
Although the Commission sometimes considers distortion complaints on a case-by-case
basis, it cannot impose fines for violations, but can only consider them in evaluating the overall
character qualifications of broadcasters when they apply for license renewals.65 Usually,
distortion complaints are accompanied by other issues (most often these were Fairness Doctrine
complaints, until the Doctrine’s’ partial repeal in 1987). However, the FCC has stated that it will
not hold up license renewals because of a distortion complaint unless there is extrinsic evidence
of direct involvement by the licensee,
including its principals, top management, or news management. For example, if it is asserted by a
newsman that he was directed by the licensee to slant the news, that would raise serious questions as to the
character qualifications of the licensee . . . However, if the allegations of staging, supported by extrinsic
evidence, simply involve news employees of the station, we will, in appropriate cases inquire into the
matter, but unless our investigation reveals involvement of the licensee or its management there will be no
hazard to the station's licensed status. Such improper actions by employees without the knowledge of the
licensee may raise questions as to whether the licensee is adequately supervising its employees, but
66
normally will not raise an issue as to the licensee's character qualifications.

Here, the Commission attempted to strike a balance between avoiding inquiries into news that
might chill the practice of journalism by threatening a broadcaster’s license, while maintaining
some incentive for broadcasters to exercise adequate supervision of news personnel. Typically,
the Commission has instructed licensees that to avoid negligence, they must craft a policy
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against distortion and communicate it to employees, conduct good faith investigations of
distortion complaints and discipline wrongdoing if it exists.67
DISTORTION COMPLAINTS, 1969-1999
To assess how the Commission has enforced its policy since codifying it in the late
1960s, this section reports the results of a quantitative analysis of all FCC decisions on distortion
released from 1969 through 1999 found in the Lexis “FCC Decisions” database. To minimize
missed cases, search terms employed included “news” within two words of “distortion” and its
major variants (“staging,” “slanting,” “deception,” “falsification,” and “suppression.”) Duplicate
hits and decisions in which the distortion rules were cited only peripherally (e.g., for purposes of
contrast or comparison to another policy) were excluded. Judicial decisions reported in the “FCC
Decisions” database, but not made by the Commission itself, were also excluded. The FCC’s
determination of whether a distortion issue was present in each instance was followed.
Each decision was coded for the specific type of complaint involved, the complainant,
whether or not the FCC investigated it, the outcome, rationale, and ultimate penalties assessed.
Complaint coding employed the definitions of slanting, staging, etc. derived above from the
clearest Commission uses of them, rather than the terms that appeared in each decision, as the
Commission sometimes used these terms imprecisely, interchangeably, or in different ways over
time. In coding for whether the Commission investigated, a low threshold was used. Although
the Commission tended to define an investigation as a hearing or field visit to gather evidence,
this study coded as an investigation any level of activity beyond reading the complainant’s claim
before dismissing it. This activity might have included as little as reviewing evidence provided
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by the complainant (such as a broadcast transcript or newspaper article), or issuing a letter of
inquiry to the licensee. The low threshold was used because of the claim sometimes made that
the FCC can intimidate or influence broadcasters simply by expressing a threat or concern, or
regulating by “lifted eyebrow.”68 Since the study is necessarily restricted to decisions reported in
the Lexis database, it does not include any complaints that were quickly dismissed (e.g., for
procedural defects, or lack of specificity or evidence,) and that did not show up in the public
record at all. If distortion complaints are similar to Fairness Doctrine complaints, the vast
majority would have been made through phone calls and letters to the Commission, rejected
immediately for insufficient evidence, and never referred to stations or mentioned in the record.69
These data only show the Commission’s ruling on the distortion issue in each decision,
which was often accompanied by other complaints (e.g., Fairness Doctrine violations, or making
misrepresentations to the FCC). The data follow the FCC’s practice of consolidating separate
complaints raised about the same station into a single decision. The data include initial decisions
as well as any appeals. 70 In general, the unit of analysis chosen was the decision, not the case,
in a good faith effort to capture the maximum number of findings of distortion, even if they were
later reversed during the appeals process. This method yielded 120 decisions that emerged from
106 cases. However, in reporting ultimate penalties the case is used as the unit of analysis, since,
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by definition, these penalties could only come at the end of the appeals process (in no case was a
penalty enforced, then reversed on appeal.)
Again, the distortion policy may be considered symbolic regulation if it has generated
some investigative activity by the FCC, but few rulings against broadcasters, light penalties, and
a record of enforcement that fails to meet the policy’s stated goals of protecting the public
against deliberately distorted news and protecting broadcasters against unwarranted intrusions on
their news judgments.
Outcomes and Penalties
The Commission has rarely held licensees in violation of the distortion rules. Figure 1
displays distortion decisions by presidential administration, showing little difference between the
FCC’s willingness to find broadcasters’ guilty under Republican (1969-1976, 1980-1992) and
Democratic (1977-1980, 1993-1999) leadership. Of the 120 reported decisions on distortion in
this period, the FCC found against broadcasters in 10.0% (12) of them. These decisions were
generated by 8 cases, because several cases generated multiple decisions as they went through
the appeals process. The number of reported decisions drops off dramatically after 1976, and
there is only one finding of distortion after 1982, when the Reagan-era FCC began to remove
content regulations on broadcast news. Again, the rate of findings of distortion is probably
overstated here, given the absence of decisions not reported in the public record. The rarity and
significance of the Commission’s findings suggest that they are more likely to show up in the
record than quick dismissals of complaints.
As for penalties, a finding of news distortion alone did not appear to have a major impact
on the Commission’s evaluation of a broadcaster’s character qualifications. In 3 of the 8 cases in
which the FCC found a broadcaster guilty, the Commission simply issued letters of
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admonishment or censure (the latter is a stronger expression of regulatory disapproval, but it
carried no additional penalty in these cases). In 2 other cases, where distortion was compounded
by numerous other infractions, the Commission issued short-term license renewals, a form of
regulatory probation, but renewed the licenses thereafter. In the final 3 cases, distortion
contributed to a host of violations that cost broadcasters their licenses. It is worth reviewing
these cases briefly to show the gap between the Commission’s sometimes stern rhetorical
rebukes of licensees and the generally light penalties assessed – a hallmark of symbolic
regulation – and the reasons why the FCC removed licenses in some cases.
Most penalties consisted of issuing letters of admonishment or censure that did not figure
heavily in subsequent license renewals, all of which were successful. For example, in 1973 the
Commission censured CBS after the network admitted that its owned and operated stations had
staged reports, both of them brought to light by a House Commerce Committee Investigations
Subcommittee probe. Although the Commission declined to find staging by CBS in four other
incidents referred by the Subcommittee, it issued a reprimand because, as the FCC delicately put
it, the network "discovered facts of significance only after the Commission confronted it with
evidence contrary to its original statements and requested further investigation."71 This artful
phrasing allowed the FCC to avoid finding CBS guilty of making misrepresentations to the
Commission, a more serious infraction that has sometimes constituted grounds for removing a
broadcast license. Despite finding that the licensee had failed to investigate itself, the
Commission declared that since it had no proof that network management knew the reports had
been massaged, or had instructed journalists to create the deceptive stories, no further penalties
would be assessed.
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Similarly, the Commission renewed WABC-TV’s license in 1982 despite finding
“repeated instances of deceptive programming broadcast by the station,” in five different news
programs over a two year period. Deceptions included staff members concocting letters and
phone calls that were presented on the air as having issued from viewers, supposedly
spontaneous questions by members of studio audiences which were prepared by staff members,
and fictitious interviews with various people misidentified as members of the public.72 After
asserting that “ABC must be held fully responsible for the willful conduct and/or disregard for
known facts by WABC-TV's highest management-level officials, whose actions or inaction
resulted in the repeated instances of public deception,” 73 the Commission allowed the network to
maintain its license since it had cooperated with the Commission’s investigation and disciplined
its news personnel.
The final letter of admonishment was issued in 1993 to NBC for staging a segment of a
Dateline NBC report on unsafe gas tanks in General Motors trucks. The report showed video of
what it called an "unscientific" test crash in which a GM truck exploded into flames after being
hit from the side. GM’s investigation found that NBC producers had rigged the test by attaching
incendiary devices to the truck's gas tank. After defending the report for six weeks, NBC finally
admitted to staging the explosion, made an on-air apology to GM, fired three producers who
contributed to the segment, and eventually dismissed its news president.74 The Commission
acted so quietly on this matter that it did not enter the letter into the FCC Record, the first
mention of this action appearing in a 1999 decision rejecting a challenge to NBC’s license
renewals. In a brief paragraph responding to a petitioner who raised the incident, among others,
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as evidence that the network’s character qualifications were lacking, the FCC noted that it had
“already reviewed the matter in detail,” and found that “the incident involved misjudgments and
professional lapses. . .”75 However, the Commission refused to say flatly that a licensee violated
its distortion rules, and the complaint had no bearing on its decision to renew NBC’s licenses.
Distortion played a small role in jeopardizing two licenses, before the Commission
renewed them. In 1975, the FCC shortened the license renewal of station KTLK-FM to one
year, in part for repeatedly airing false weather broadcasts that its personnel knew had no basis in
fact. However, the Commission also based its decision to discipline KTLK on several other
violations, including promotion of a lottery and leaving the station’s transmitter unattended.
Despite finding extrinsic evidence of management knowledge, the decision equivocated, noting
that “all that takes this licensee's conduct from the core of . . . ‘willful distortion’ . . . is that there
is no evidence that the licensee knew the actual temperatures and, for motive, warped that
information . . .” 76 The FCC also designated several of Gross Telecasting’s licenses for hearings
partly on charges of distortion, and a plethora of other issues, such as “clipping” network
broadcasts (whereby an affiliate violates its network contract by shortening network programs to
insert more ads), misleading advertisers, and making misrepresentations and lack of candor with
the Commission.77 The distortion issue turned on whether the broadcaster used undisclosed
taped weather broadcasts and whether the licensee told his news staff to suppress coverage of a
tennis tournament at a local club (which had been covered in prior years) because the club failed
to pay its advertising bill to the station. After an eight year appeals process, the full Commission
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reversed an administrative law judge’s finding against Gross, rejected the judge’s
recommendation to remove the broadcaster’s license, and granted a short-term license renewal.78
The Commission, which had two memos from owner H.F. Gross instructing his Sports Director
not to cover the tournament until the club paid up, concluded that the memos “probably had an
improper inhibitory effect on WJIM-TV's sports coverage of the Lansing Tennis Club,” a
circumlocutory way of saying that Gross distorted the news for private business reasons.79
However, the Commission whittled down the number of instances in which the ALJ found
violations of FCC policy on the other issues, until it could conclude that they “were infrequent or
single incidents followed by remedial action.”80
Findings of distortion did contribute to three license nonrenewals over the thirty year
period under study. In Star Stations, the Commission stripped several of Star’s licenses for
conducting fraudulent contests, making misrepresentations to the Commission, offering gifts and
favors to the head of a broadcast ratings service, intimidating and harassing employees to prevent
them from cooperating with the FCC, committing a felony by making illegal campaign
contributions, and distorting news. In relation to news distortion, the FCC found that Star’s
owner, Don Burden, had used two of his radio stations to promote political candidates through
the news, and to make illegal campaign contributions to them. During the 1964 Indiana Senate
campaign, Burden directed news personnel at one of his stations to mention positive news of
Senator Vance Hartke on every newscast, in exchange for Hartke’s assistance in resolving an
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FCC investigation into misleading use of audience ratings to boost advertising rates at Burden’s
stations. Burden also gave the Senator several thousand dollars of advertising time on the station
that was never billed, which constituted an illegal campaign contribution. In 1966, Burden
similarly instructed employees at another station to promote Mark Hatfield’s candidacy for
Senator from Oregon, and to mention only negative news of his opponent. Burden also filtered
more illegal campaign contributions through station employees. Here, the Commission was not
simply concerned with distortion of the news per se, but with Burden’s “attempts to use
broadcast facilities to subvert the political process”81 through both the news and the
contributions. The ruling found that Star’s “newscasts were used as a vehicle to publicize
Burden’s preferred candidate – not as an exercise of news judgment, but as a deception of the
public and to further his private interests.”82 The ruling also noted that Burden’s lying to the
Commission, and numerous other violations of its policies listed above, were significant to its
decision.83
In the early 1980s, the FCC relied heavily on additional precedents concerning broadcast
hoaxes to try to curb a flurry of deceptive radio station promotions.84 Here too, the Commission
took licenses. The first case involved radio station KIKX, where management staged the
kidnapping of a disc jockey as a promotional stunt. By reporting the “kidnapping” in its news
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program, the station violated the news distortion rules as well. Again, the case included
multiple allegations, including the station’s failure to log commercials properly, to maintain its
transmitter according to technical standards, and to operate an adequate equal employment
opportunity program.85 The FCC also revoked the license of WMJX-FM for airing nine
fraudulent and deceptive contests over the span of two years. A promotion that entailed false
claims that a disoriented disc jockey had disappeared in Miami, and that the station needed its
listeners’ help to recover him safely, became the straw that broke the station’s back. The disc
jockey’s “disappearance” was reported on the station’s news with management’s knowledge.86
The Commission’s recent actions raise questions about whether the agency has moved
from treating the distortion rules as symbolic regulation to orphaning them without public
admission or public input. Since 1982, the FCC has issued only one finding of distortion (based
on GM’s investigation of NBC, not the Commission’s, and the network’s prior public admission
of guilt.) Moreover, in this time period, the FCC has not even held a hearing on, nor conducted a
field investigation into, a distortion complaint. It also seems to have begun burying decisions
adverse to broadcasters, weakening their future use as precedents. Its 1982 admonishment of
WABC was not printed in the FCC Record, did not explicitly relate its ruling or rationale to the
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news distortion rules, and, despite being adopted on December 8 was not released until two days
before Christmas, as if to minimize public attention. The Commission withheld mention of its
letter of admonishment to NBC in the GM case from the public record for six years, referring to
(but not reprinting) it only when NBC’s character was challenged during a license renewal.
Despite the FCC’s periodic reaffirmation of its policy, it now appears to be up to the courts to
force the Commission to take the rules seriously enough to look into any allegations of
distortion. This is suggested by a recent case, discussed below, in which the U.S. District Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia for the first time vacated the FCC's dismissal of a
distortion complaint and remanded it to the Commission for an investigation. Using the FCC's
own stated criteria in its precedent rulings, the Court found that the Commission acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously" in its decision not to investigate, forcing the first full FCC inquiry
into distortion in sixteen years.87
Complaints and Complainants
The vast majority of distortion complaints have concerned slanting (see Table 1.) The
high number of slanting charges can probably be attributed to petitioners’ tendency to add
distortion claims to Fairness Doctrine complaints, as another means of alleging bias in news. It
may also have to do with the vagueness of the FCC’s definition of slanting, which may suggest
to complainants that the Commission is more likely to act on news bias than it has been willing
to do.
Although slanting has been the most common charge, these kinds of complaints have
been least likely to trigger an investigation by the Commission, and among the least likely to be
successful. In contrast, the Commission has been most likely to probe staging claims, which are
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also the most likely type to succeed. Of all of the types of distortion, slanting charges most
appear to trigger the Commission’s reluctance to investigate licensee’s editorial judgments, since
these accusations involve broadcasters using deceptive means to favor a particular viewpoint on
a significant public issue. The only findings of slanting came in decisions generated by the longrunning Star Stations and Gross Telecasting cases, in which substantial evidence showed
licensees suppressed or promoted news for ideological or business reason. To the extent that the
Commission has been willing to find against broadcasters, it has been most likely to do so in
staging and deception cases, where it has restricted its focus more to questions of journalistic
technique, rather than to the political direction of reporting. These findings fall into two
categories. First, there are decisions that emerged in cases where the Commission received
broadcasters’ prior admissions of staging or deception, either established by Congressional
investigation (in the 1973 CBS staging case), or by a corporation targeted in an investigative
report (in the GM-NBC staging decision), or by the station’s own investigation of its news
personnel (in the 1982 WABC deception case). Here, the FCC has done little or no independent
investigating of its own, and has assessed no penalty stiffer than censure. Second, there are the
two cases involving repeated contest hoaxes, in which the Commission has probed more fully,
and has stripped licenses.
Different kinds of complainants have enjoyed varying levels of success in spurring the
Commission to investigate claims and find distortion. Although citizens and citizen groups have
brought over half of all complaints, they are among the least likely to convince the FCC to
investigate and rule against broadcasters. In the lone successful complaint by the public, Gross
Telecasting, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was joined by the FCC’s Broadcast
Bureau in its charges and probe. Many complaints by the public seemed to be less familiar with
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the FCC’s evidentiary requirements, and tended to lack the legal expertise that was more
available to other petitioners. Businesses filing claims against unfavorable reporting also
generated a low rate of investigations, and won no rulings. Politicians and candidates for office
filed the second largest proportion of complaints, often based on coverage of their own
campaigns or policy debates in which they were involved. Political figures also had low rates of
sparking investigations and winning decisions. In the only successful complaint by a politician,
the chair of the House Commerce Committee’s Investigations Subcommittee convinced the
Commission to find CBS guilty of distortion in one of the numerous cases the Subcommittee
referred the FCC over a four year period. Competing applicants for broadcasters’ licenses had
somewhat more success at getting the FCC to probe distortion charges when they brought claims
in the context of comparative license hearings into qualifications of the incumbent and
challenger. Possessing professional legal representation and a strong economic incentive to
appeal adverse decisions may explain their relative success. However, they won just two
decisions in these cases, both in the marathon Star Stations case, in which the FCC’s Broadcast
Bureau also took a prosecutorial role. Journalists, who generally alleged that management
pressured them to slant the news to promote or protect the interests of a parent company or
advertisers, convinced the Commission to investigate more often than any complainants besides
the Commission itself. Journalists testifying about their own employers could offer extrinsic
evidence of distortion more easily than outsiders. Yet the FCC never ultimately found for a
reporter, mainly because of the Commission’s reluctance to second-guess the editorial discretion
of the licensee (discussed later.) The FCC itself emerged as the most successful “complainant”
in all respects. In the few decisions in which the Commission’s Broadcast Bureau seemed to be
the main source of allegations, they were always probed, and broadcasters were always found
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liable. Except for the ACLU’s involvement in Star Stations, there was no mention in the
decisions of outside sources who might have alerted the FCC or helped investigate.88
Evidence of Symbolic Regulation
The Commission has not ignored distortion complaints and has maintained some low
level of investigative action on them, although there has been a considerable drop-off in reported
cases and probes since the deregulatory 1980s. The symbolic nature of the FCC’s oversight is
suggested by the paucity of distortion decisions against broadcasters, and of significant penalties
assessed. In addition, if the FCC hopes to check deceptive presentations of political issues, one
might expect the Commission to exhibit more concern for charges of slanting than for the more
technical issues of staging and deception. The lower investigation and success rates for slanting
cases suggest otherwise. The perils of government regulation of speech may be highest in
slanting cases, but so too is the public interest in the integrity of the political information it
receives. Slanting charges tend to involve accusations of deliberate distortion of political issues,
politicians and candidates, including distortion to serve the licensee’s ideological or business
interests. The Commission has been more willing to find distortion in staging and deception
cases, where it has relied on outsiders’ investigations and penalized lightly, or in contest hoaxes,
where it has probed and sanctioned more aggressively.
The Commission’s overriding tendency to rule against complaints filed by outside parties
also raises questions about its resolve to enforce the distortion rules. Although the Commission
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has looked into journalists’ complaints about their employers, it has not found one yet that
trumps a licensee’s editorial rights. The FCC has been less responsive to complaints of
distortion brought by others, with the exception of a handful of cases in which the Commission
itself took the lead in showing distortion. The Commission has depended primarily on outsiders
to alert it to wrongdoing, but it has not been very receptive to their complaints. In sum, the
Commission appears to have weighed broadcasters’ speech rights more heavily than public
accountability in this area. Whether it has done so wisely, and met its twin policy goals of
protecting the public and broadcasters, requires more investigation of the means by which the
FCC has arrived at these decisions.
THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF
As William Ray, the former FCC Chief of Broadcast Complaints and Compliance, has
written, "Time after time, after denouncing news rigging or slanting as the most 'heinous' sin of
all, the Commission has found some reason for doing nothing. The reason usually advanced is
lack of proof that the deed was ordered by the owner or top management.”89 Indeed, the
Commission’s most cited reasons for dismissing these complaints are lack of extrinsic evidence
of distortion, and inability to show management knowledge or intent (see table 3). Together,
these two grounds account for 60% of all reasons for dismissals. The Commission is less likely
to cite disconfirming or insufficient evidence, reasons that tend to be associated with deeper
investigation and weighing of evidence. The other reasons for dismissal include deeming alleged
distortions to be within the bounds of licensees’ editorial discretion, and finding procedural
errors (such as a more appropriate legal or regulatory forum for the complaint, mootness, or lack

doing additional investigative work, so the FCC was not coded as a complainant here. See
WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 383 (1978).
89
RAY, supra note 10, at 6.
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of specificity). In a handful of instances, the Commission has offered no clear reason for
throwing out a complaint.
A recent Court of Appeals ruling in a distortion case demonstrates some of the
shortcomings of the Commission’s extrinsic evidence standard and its application. The case
involved a complaint by Alexander J. Serafyn, a Ukrainian-American, against a 1994 CBS 60
Minutes report, "The Ugly Face of Freedom," on the revival of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine. In
the story, correspondent Morley Safer suggested that contemporary Ukrainians were "genetically
anti-Semitic" and "uneducated peasants, deeply superstitious." A Ukrainian rabbi interviewed
later objected that his remarks were misedited to give the impression that he thought all
Ukrainians were anti-Semites who desired to rid their country of Jews. “CBS overlaid the sound
of marching boots on a film clip of Ukrainian Boy Scouts walking to church and introduced it in
such a way as to give viewers the impression that they were seeing ‘a neo-Nazi, Hitler Youthlike movement.”90 Safer reported that the Ukrainian Galicia Division had helped to round up and
execute Jews in 1941, “though this Division was not in fact even formed until 1943 and therefore
could not possibly have participated in the deed.”91 The court noted that "perhaps most
egregiously, when Ukrainian speakers used the term 'zhyd,' which means simply 'Jew,' they were
translated as having said 'kike,' which is a derogatory term."92 CBS declined to submit evidence
on its behalf, maintaining that any government inquiry into its news practices “offends the
protections of a free press.”93 The FCC summarily denied the complaint on grounds that Serafyn
failed to offer sufficient extrinsic evidence of intent.94 The Court rejected the FCC ruling for
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misapplying its own evidentiary standard without offering a rationale for doing so95, echoing (but
not citing) some previous Commissioners’ dissents in distortion cases.
Rising Evidentiary Standard for Investigative Hearings
First, the Serafyn court objected to the FCC’s misapplying its own standard for
determining whether a complainant presented a prima facie case for a distortion hearing,
requiring the petitioner to “’demonstrate’ that CBS intended to distort the news rather than
merely to ‘raise a substantial and material question of fact’ about the licensee’s intent . . .”96
Indeed, the standard of proof imposed on complainants by the FCC, and its reluctance to
investigate, seem to have crept upward over time. Shortly after the Commission unanimously
rewrote its distortion policy in 1969, Commissioners Kenneth Cox and Nicholas Johnson began
to dissent from some decisions on similar grounds as the Serafyn court. At this time, the FCC
majority seemed to move from saying that it would not hold up a license renewal without
extrinsic evidence of management involvement in distortion97 to saying that it would not even
investigate without this evidence. For example, in a 1970 decision, the majority rejected a
complaint against WMAL-TV for allegedly suppressing news displaying inter-racial romance.
The station had invited a theater group to present an excerpt from the play “The Dutchman,” yet
refused to tape it, allegedly after discovering that the scene involved a black man and white
woman kissing. The theater group accused the station of having a policy against showing
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Serafyn v. F.C.C., 149 F.3d 1213, 1218 (D.C., Cir., 1998).
Id. at 1220.
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In its 1969 precedent ruling Hunger in America the Commission wrote: “We wish to
make it clear that, in the future, we do not intend to defer action on license renewals because of
the pendency of complaints of the kind we have investigated here -- unless the extrinsic evidence
of possible deliberate distortion or staging of the news which is brought to our attention, involves
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physical intimacy between the races. Citing “conflicting statements from the complainant and
the licensee in this case,” the majority wrote that
it is simply not appropriate for the Commission to designate the matter for an evidentiary hearing upon a
credibility (demeanor) finding, whether to credit the statement of motive of the licensee. Absent extrinsic
evidence going to a policy inconsistent with the public interest . . . [the Commission] will not seek to
98
establish the ‘true’ motives by inference or credibility findings in this sensitive area .

In dissent, Commissioner Cox objected “that our investigation has been inadequate either to
resolve the matter or to demonstrate that the dispute cannot be resolved except upon the basis of
a judgment as to the credibility of conflicting witnesses.”99 Pointing to the theater group’s
testimony about why the report was cancelled, Cox maintained that
there is ‘substantial extrinsic evidence of motives inconsistent with the public interest’ in this record.
Certainly there is as much as you will ever get short of an admission by a licensee of improper conduct,
written policies which are improper or their face, or the example used by the majority: ‘testimony of a
station employee concerning his instructions from management.’ Such testimony adverse to his employer
would quite probably be disputed by management, but in that case the majority are apparently willing to get
100
into matters of demeanor and credibility.

Unwillingness to Consider Evidence as a Whole
In Serafyn, the court objected that, in addition to relying on an unreasonably high
standard of proof, the FCC seemed to evaluate each piece of evidence individually, deciding that
no piece in itself sufficed to show intentional distortion, when it should have asked whether the
evidence as a whole was sufficient to warrant an investigation.101 Indeed, when complainants
can present extrinsic evidence of deliberate distortions, the Commission tends to atomize and
dismiss them as isolated lapses, rather than weigh them as a whole and consider whether they
warrant inquiry or penalty. This is especially true of evidence that might establish a pattern or

will, in appropriate cases . . . inquire into the matter . . .” Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143,
150 (1969) (emphasis added).
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Citizens Communication Center (WMAL), 25 F.C.C.2d 705, 707 (1970).
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Id. at 709.
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Serafyn v. F.C.C., 149 F.3d 1213, 1220 (D.C., Cir., 1998) (“In making its decision, the
Commission must consider together all the evidence it has.”)
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policy of distortion, which would justify a stronger response.102 The Serafyn court found that the
Commission wrongly dismissed the complaint for failing to show a pattern of intent to distort by
CBS beyond this single story, ignoring potential evidence of such a pattern. The court pointed to
complainant’s submission of prior published statements attributed to 60 Minutes senior reporter
Mike Wallace (“You don’t like to baldly lie, but I have”) and executive producer Don Hewitt
(justifying journalistic deception because “[i]t’s the small crime vs. the greater good,” and
claiming “I wouldn’t make Hitler look bad on the air if I could get a good story.”)103
The Commission has rejected stronger evidence of generalized distortion in the past, even
when it has agreed to investigate. In 1973, when CBS stations admitted staging two reports, the
Commission declined to pursue the matter further by presenting them as isolated incidents.
Reiterating its policy that “a pattern of repeated acts of this kind by employees may raise
questions as to whether the licensee is adequately supervising its employees,” the Commission
concluded that “during the span of years covered by these incidents, the network and stations
licensed to it . . . have presented thousands of other news reports or documentaries on which we
have received no allegations of staging or deliberate distortion.”104 However, in the same ruling
the Commission dealt with complaints about four other incidents from the House Commerce
Committee, declining to act on them on grounds of insufficient evidence, despite exhaustive
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Whether the Commission must find a policy or pattern of wrongdoing before acting
has itself been a matter of debate. In Mark Lane, the majority dismissed a complaint against a
TV station for deleting a talk show guest’s anti-military comments, claiming it feared they were
defamatory, yet attributing the deletions on the air to “technical difficulties.” The majority said
it would not investigate without “substantial extrinsic evidence” of a policy of “discriminatory
programming” [citing NBC ‘Today’ Program (Letter to Hon. William H. Harsha), 31 F.C.C.2d
847 (1971)]. In dissent, Commissioner Johnson noted that in the past the FCC had held that one
instance of discrimination could abridge the public interest [citing Letter to Albert H. Kramer, 25
F.C.C.2d 705 (1970)]. Mark Lane, 37 F.C.C.2d 630, 633, 635 (1972).
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inquiry by the Committee and the Commission. In addition, the FCC had handled at least five
prior complaints about CBS in the previous five years, most referred from Congress. In several
of these rulings, the Commission repeatedly took CBS to task for inadequately investigating
itself, yet did not consider whether this constituted a pattern of negligent oversight of employees,
and always declined to find distortion.105 Similarly, in Chronicle Broadcasting, the
complainants objected to the hearing examiner’s failure to evaluate the overall picture of
Chronicle’s actions by “taking each item of alleged news management, analyzing it separately,
and ruling on each in favor of Chronicle,” 106 citing the Commission’s own rejection of such an
approach in previous cases.107
What would constitute a pattern of deceptive practices? The record sheds little light on
this question. The Commission found, in WMJX and Walton, that hoaxes reported as news over
a span of days rose to the level of a pattern, yet declined to question whether repeated
accusations against CBS and its failure to investigate them properly over several years exhibited
one. In WPIX, the Commission could not discern a pattern in over three months of dubious news
practices, including over thirty instances of misrepresenting journalists as reporting from the
scene of an event, mislabeling film as being delivered “via satellite,” using stale video to
illustrate “current” events without disclosure, misrepresenting the true location shown in video,
and identifying outside journalists as WPIX reporters. The decision found that the “inaccurate
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See Letter to ABC, 16 F.C.C.2d 650, 659 (1969) (requesting detailed reports of alleged
staging incidents from all three networks); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (WBBM), 18
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investigative report to the Commission . . .”); Selling of the Pentagon, 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 153
(1971) (urging the network to engage in "good-faith, earnest self-examination" of its editing
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embellishments concerning peripheral aspects of some of [WPIX’s] news items were . . . few in
number . . .”108 When the Commission has perceived a pattern of deceptive news, it has
sometimes turned to mitigating circumstances, as in the WABC case discussed above, in which
the FCC admonished the station but renewed its license because the Commission was satisfied
with the station’s investigation and disciplining of its employees.
Vague, Arbitrary Definition of Extrinsic Evidence
In Serafyn, the court observed that “the Commission has not so much defined extrinsic
evidence as provided examples of the genre and what lies outside it.”109 The FCC repeated its
longstanding requirement for “’evidence outside the broadcast itself,’ such as evidence of written
or oral instructions from station management, outtakes, or evidence of bribery,”110 or testimony
from ‘insiders’ or persons who have direct personal knowledge of intentional distortion. Without
such evidence, it would not infer intent to deceive from the broadcast itself. The Commission
added that “Extrinsic evidence [must] demonstrate that a broadcaster knew elements of a news
story were false or distorted, but nevertheless, proceeded to air such programming.”111
In practice, the FCC has treated lightly evidence that seems to fit within its own
definition, often refusing to investigate it. It has consistently cast a jaundiced eye on affidavits
from news sources and eyewitnesses alleging distortion, sometimes over the dissents of its own
members.112 The Commission has not granted much more credence to journalists who have
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affidavit from theater producer contending that play excerpt was censored not because it
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testified to distortion, despite its stated openness to information from insiders. In Chronicle
Broadcasting, it found inconclusive numerous eyewitness and second-hand accounts compiled
over several years by a KRON-TV camera operator that station management directed reporters to
suppress news that reflected poorly on its parent company’s business interests (including
coverage of a controversial Joint Operating Agreement granted to the San Francisco Chronicle
and San Francisco Examiner, and strikes against the company’s media properties), and slanting
reports to provide favorable coverage of communities in which the company was seeking cable
television franchises. Among other evidence, the Commission rejected a documentary
producer’s account of being told by the president to kill a report on political factionalism in one
town where Chronicle was seeking a cable license, and sloughed off several memos and the
testimony of an assignment editor suggesting that the president directed the station’s news
director to cover a positive story in another city to improve Chronicle’s cable bid.113
In Tri-State Broadcasting Co, two newscasters alleged that they were fired from their
jobs at KTSM-TV for refusing management’s orders to slant news to serve the interests of local
advertisers and politicians. The FCC dismissed for failure to provide extrinsic evidence of
intent, rejecting one reporter’s testimony that he was instructed to promote news favorable to

contained adult themes, as station claimed, but because it had a policy against showing news of
inter-racial romance; Commission dismissed without seeking affidavits from news personnel
present during the incident); see also Mark Lane, 37 F.C.C.2d 630, 635 (1972) (Commissioner
Johnson, in dissent, objecting to majority’s refusal to act on author’s affidavit asserting that
station deleted his anti-military remarks not because they were defamatory, but because the
station disagreed with them; refusing action on a viewer letter from station’s files complaining
about station’s deleting a talk show guest’s views on marijuana because they were
"unconventional,” not due to technical difficulties, as station claimed); American Broadcasting
Co., 45 F.C.C.2d 41 (1973) (declining to find extrinsic evidence of staging a high school protest,
despite eyewitness letters from press photographer and testimony of school security officer that
camera crew directed protesters); Louisiana Stations, 7 F.C.C.R. 1503, 1506-7 (1992)
(dismissing talk show guest’s complaint that his criticisms of used car dealers were suppressed
by station to avoid offending advertisers).
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advertisers for having “merely set forth his own evaluation of certain news items broadcast by
KTSM which, in his view, were not newsworthy.”114 In drawing on the same boilerplate
language it often uses when dismissing distortion complaints from the public, the Commission
did not seem to accord any additional weight to the news judgment of a journalist, who would
appear to be somewhat more responsible for defining what is newsworthy at his station on a day
to day basis. Yet a journalist’s testimony that he or she would have covered a story about an
advertiser had management not forbidden it, or would not have covered one had management not
demanded it, constitutes a special kind of evidence that can illuminate a broadcaster’s intent to
slant. If the Commission is concerned with a licensee’s promoting or suppressing news “not as
an exercise of news judgment, but as a deception of the public and to further his private
interests,”115 then a journalist’s account of management intervention in the news selection
process seems to be the most powerful evidence the Commission will get about management’s
intentions, short of an admission of guilt. Nonetheless, the Commission has consistently chosen
to weigh management’s denials of intent more heavily than journalists’ testimony.116
The Serafyn court partly based its finding of arbitrariness on the fact that the FCC has not
entirely avoided assessing the content of a report in the past, and inferring intent from it, despite
its claims to the contrary. In its precedent ruling in Hunger in America, the Commission left
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open a door to considering more than extrinsic evidence of management intent “in the unusual
case where the matter can be readily and definitely resolved.”117 Although the FCC has rarely
peered through that door to find culpability, the court pointed to the WMJX hoax case, in which
station management admitted knowing that a newscast about “missing” disc jockey Greg Austin
was false, but denied intent to deceive the public, saying that the reports were intended as humor.
The FCC determined that “newscasts reporting that the ‘Trip’ had put Austin ‘out of touch’ and
that he was ‘mind-boggled’ and had ‘wandered off’ were clearly false and deceptive.”118
Rejecting the station’s claim that its news director, who wrote the reports, did not intend the
audience to take them as factual, the Commission implicitly concluded that because they were
false he intended to deceive rather than entertain. His “asserted lack of intent is not credible,”
the Commission wrote, “and the ALJ was entitled to reject his testimony that he was merely
taking a ‘writer's liberty.’”119 The Serafyn court analogized: “Here, Serafyn argues that CBS got
its facts so wrong that its decision to broadcast them gives rise to the inference that CBS
intentionally distorted the news.” The court noted that,
while the Commission certainly may focus upon evidence relevant to intent and exclude all else, the
problem is – as the Commission’s past decisions show – that the inaccuracy of a broadcast can sometimes
be indicative of the broadcaster’s intent . . .an egregious or obvious error may indeed suggest that the
120
station intended to mislead.
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Although the court quickly cautioned that it did not expect the FCC to investigate every
accusation of inaccuracy, just the egregious and obvious, it seemed to have pushed the
Commission to reopen the door to some inference from the news text.
The Serafyn court clearly construed the Commission’s definition of extrinsic evidence
more broadly than the Commission has in recent years. Despite the occasional peek at the
broadcast text to infer intent, the FCC has mainly restricted itself to considering the “examples of
the genre” it laid out in the late 1960s. In contrast, the court took the FCC to task for giving
“illogical or incomplete reasons” for dismissing several examples of extrinsic evidence that
might have shed light on whether the producers' intended to mislead their audience.121 This
evidence included letters from interviewees that might have shed light on the producers’ state of
mind when creating the report (such as an interviewee’s letter stating that the CBS producers
misled him about the nature of the story). It also included letters from viewers that could help
illuminate the gravity of factual errors (such as a letter from a rabbi who explained the correct
translation of “zhyd” as “Jew,” not “kike.”) The evidence also included CBS’ refusal to consult
an expert on Ukrainian history, who offered his services to the producers. Here, the court
rejected the Commission’s argument that this refusal could not establish intent to distort because
the choice of experts was solely a matter of CBS’ editorial discretion, which the FCC will not
question. The court maintained that “it is only because the broadcaster has such discretion that
its ultimate decision may be probative on the issue of intent.”122 Before the Commission could
throw out this information, it had to explain “why CBS’s decision to employ one expert over
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another – or not to employ any expert at all – is not probative on the issue of its intent to
distort.”123
The Serafyn decision suggests that the Commission has not clarified its definition of
extrinsic evidence. Too often, the flexibility of the FCC’s definition seems to be deployed to
avoid finding fault. It is not clear whether the definition of extrinsic evidence is limited to the
examples laid out in the FCC’s early precedent decisions or not, and in what ways the
Commission will or will not infer intent from the broadcast text. The Commission seems
unwilling to weigh very heavily journalists’ testimony about their superiors’ intent to slant news.
Unreasonable Burden of Proof
Complainants have almost always shouldered the burden of introducing evidence, and the
heavier burden of proving deliberate distortion. They must demonstrate that distortion was
initiated by or known to the licensee or to its management. The difficulty of overcoming
broadcasters’ denials of intent or knowledge is compounded by complainants’ lack of any right
to compel discovery of the requisite extrinsic evidence. In defamation cases, the Supreme Court
has recognized that it is unreasonable to require petitioners to show that defendants acted with
absolute malice, which necessitates discussion of reporters’ state of mind when preparing a story,
without enjoying a right to discovery.124 Distortion complainants may wonder why the FCC has
not extended the same courtesy to them.
The Commission’s reasoning in a case that stands as an apparent exception to this rule
might well be used to abolish the rule. The case was Chronicle Broadcasting, in which the
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Commission shifted the burden of proof to Chronicle because “the principal facts surrounding
Chronicle's alleged misconduct were peculiarly within its knowledge since those facts concerned
the use of Chronicle's broadcast facilities.”125 It is unclear why the allegations in this case, of
promoting and suppressing news to favor the business interests of the licensee’s parent company,
set it apart from any other news distortion claim in this regard. By definition, any licensee’s
intent to distort the news to serve private ideological or business interests would appear to be
“peculiarly within the licensee’s knowledge” and involve the use of his or her broadcast
facilities. The FCC’s “distinction” in this case could as easily become the basis for shifting the
burden of proof to licensees in all distortion cases.
More typically, the Commission has justified its inaction by taking licensees’ denials of
intent to distort at face value, then dismissing complaints on grounds of conflicting evidence. In
doing so, it has often practiced a “curious neutrality in favor of the licensee” when assigning the
burden of proof to complainants and resolving contradictory evidence, despite the Circuit Court
of Appeals instructions against doing so.126 Even in Chronicle, as Commissioner Johnson
argued in dissent, the FCC seemed to shift the burden of proof back to the complainants,
accepting the hearing examiner’s requirement that they show "clear, convincing and
unambiguous evidence" of the licensee's motives.127 The Commission justified this move by
stating that a lower standard might place the FCC “in the role of a censor imputing improper
motivation for programming of which it disapproves.”128 Johnson countered that the FCC should
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place the burden of disproving intent on broadcasters in such cases, and that it could do so
without violating licensees’ editorial freedom:
[T]hough [the evidence] includes ‘speech’ to the extent that it involves conversations and management
orders, it is surely not subject to First Amendment protections. Such conversations were clandestine. They
were surely not designed to encourage debate on public issues. Further, those words which were introduced
as evidence were the sort of speech encountered in conspiracy cases where X orders Y to ‘take care of’ Z.
What the majority holds, in effect, is that even if it is clear that X so directed Y, principles of free speech
somehow demand that X's motives be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This, I think, is
absurd.
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Arbitrary Evaluation of Management Responsibility
The Commission’s requirement of broadcaster intent or knowledge has created an
evidentiary thicket that allows the FCC to avoid finding licensees responsible for distortion.
Brian C. Murchison’s assessment of the Commission’s reluctance to find licensees guilty of
making misrepresentations to the FCC can be applied as easily to its timidity in distortion cases.
In both kinds of cases, the Commission must find deliberate and knowing deception. “[A]n
inquiry based on mental state gives the agency flexibility,” observes Murchison.
It affords defense lawyers room to argue the circumstances of each case so that there are virtually no
‘precedents’ which can command a certain result. Citizen groups alleging misrepresentation plainly do not
benefit from the standard, but seem not to have specified the standard itself as a problem -- only the
agency's reluctance in ambiguous cases to draw inferences and to make a finding of intentional
130
deception.

In relation to distortion, the Commission tends to use its flexibility to shield broadcast
management from responsibility for deceptive news.
On the one hand, the FCC has maintained that
it is well established that responsibility for the selection and presentation of broadcast material ultimately
devolves upon the individual station licensee and that the fulfillment of the public interest requires the free
exercise of his independent judgment . . . In addition, broadcast licensees must assume responsibility for all
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material which is broadcast through their facilities. This responsibility may not be delegated.
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The Commission has relied on the ultimate responsibility of the licensee to reject claims to a
qualified right of access to the airwaves for journalists once they are hired by a station, 132 and to
news sources once they are invited to speak on a program.133 The FCC has cited this ultimate
responsibility in the few cases in which it ruled against broadcasters despite management denials
of knowledge or intent to distort. For example, in its second Star Stations decision, the FCC
decided that even if it lacked evidence that top management knew about slanted campaign
coverage, “the same ignorance which protects Star’s character qualifications casts a long shadow
across the adequacy of its supervision of the station,”134 and this helped tip the balance in favor
of a competing license applicant. Note that there is no Catch-22 here for broadcasters. The
Commission made it clear in its precedent rulings that broadcasters will not be found negligent if
they communicate a policy against distortion to employees, engage in good faith investigations
of alleged deception, and take some action if wrongdoing is found.135
On the other hand, the Commission has tended to shield licensees from responsibility by
attributing distortion to journalists, yet finding management neither responsible nor negligent in
132
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overseeing its news personnel. In the WBBM precedent, the FCC declared that the reporter who
instigated a pot party despite his news director’s advice to avoid staging “should not be regarded
as the fall guy in this case, but rather the licensee, under established policies, should bear the
brunt of responsibility for the matter.”136 Nonetheless, it did not find WBBM management
culpable, and assessed no penalty. Nine years later, in WPIX, the Commission overrode its
Broadcast Bureau Counsel’s recommendation to award the station’s license to a competing
applicant in part on character issues, excusing months of deceptive news practices as
“attributable to one employee . . . who was the new, inexperienced producer of the evening news
show during the period in which the aberrations occurred.”137 It seemed to excuse the head of
the news department for failing to oversee the producer in part because at the time he “was
involved in a large number of planning sessions with other department heads and management
[so] it is not surprising that there were some initial difficulties in the news show's operation.”138
In dissent, three Commissioners objected that by
absolving WPIX from responsibility for the acts of the news program producer it selected and clothed with
its authority, the majority not only departs from FCC precedent, but also runs afoul of one of the most basic
principles of corporate law and administrative law in general. The law clearly requires that WPIX be held
accountable for [its employees’] acts which resulted in a pattern of deception in violation of the station's
139
public trust.

The dissenters argued that WPIX did not carry out its duty to investigate its employees’
misconduct, brought to its attention by one of its own news writers’ complaints and by an article
in Variety, for two years, when its license was designated for a hearing by the Commission on
these issues and others. The Broadcast Bureau concluded that the station conducted “a
meaningless investigation that was intended to conceal rather than reveal the facts, the
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employees who brought complaints quit or were fired by the licensee, no other WPIX employee
[besides the news producer]... was fired or even reprimanded, and there was no licensee policy or
control to prevent the news malpractices.”140
Short of an admission of knowledge or guilt by management, it is extraordinarily difficult
for the FCC to prove either in the corporate setting. As Commissioner Johnson wrote in dissent
in Chronicle Broadcasting,
It is the rare case, indeed, where a member of the public -- or even a station's cameraman -- will be able to
trace back orders from middle-management to the corporation's highest officials. The majority, by requiring
that the corporation's highest executives must be proved to have had knowledge of – and to have condoned
141
– middle-management conduct, erects an impenetrable shield around the corporate vehicle.

In another dissent, Johnson observed that “responsibility is already substantially diffused
throughout the corporate hierarchies of many large licensees. And when this Commission is
alerted to charges of ‘payola,’ or news ‘staging,’ or fraudulent billing, its investigations often run
into a blank wall . . . The problem is finding out ‘who's in charge here?’”142 Indeed, the
networks, where layers of management are most dense, have only been found liable for distortion
in the admonishment of NBC for staging the GM truck fires, issued after the network admitted
it.143
Exacerbating the FCC’s difficulty in establishing responsibility in news distortion cases
is its shadowy definition of management. The Commission will not act without evidence that
distortion was initiated by or known to the licensee or to “its principals, top management, or
news management.”144 Implicating news managers, who are closest on the chain of command to
journalists, is a complainant’s best chance to meet this requirement. Yet it is not always clear
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from previous rulings whom the Commission would count as a news manager. In most cases, a
station’s news director is treated as part of its news management. But in WPIX the dissenting
Commissioners noted that the majority decision focused entirely on the chief of the news
department’s actions, ignoring a memo from the news director stating that “the key to rebuilding
the news image lies equally in more frequent exposure during the week and in a cleverly
designed campaign to create the illusion . . . that WPIX has a fully competitive news gathering
facility.”145 The dissenters saw such a campaign as being carried out by the news producer. The
Circuit Court, in Serafyn, seemed to consider the 60 Minutes executive producer and senior
correspondent to be part of the network’s news management,146 which seems to be a more
inclusive definition than the Commission has used thus far.
In practice, the management intent standard seems to give the Commission great latitude
to isolate and excuse wrongdoing in the lower organizational echelons, and licensees the power
to deny responsibility. The Commission’s tendency to allow accountability to dissipate down the
long corridors of corporate broadcasters undermines its goal of encouraging licensees to probe
themselves and deal honestly with outsiders, including the Commission itself. Again,
Murchison’s assessment of the Commission’s handling of misrepresentation applies to its
treatment of distortion. He writes that the FCC
is an agency moving in two different directions: on the one hand, stating a strong policy requiring accuracy
and threatening a potent sanction for offenders; on the other hand, developing a definition of liability which
allows maximum discretion for appraising individual cases, so that the decision-makers may avoid
147
imposing the sanction.
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What’s News?
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the news distortion policy is that the Commission
has never offered a clear definition of what it considers news, and what, therefore, it is
attempting to regulate. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Commission applied its distortion rules
to a broad range of programming in cases involving a theatrical excerpt banned from a women’s
morning television program,148 an anti-war halftime presentation blacked out of a football
game,149 and staff-written questions presented as spontaneous audience remarks in a morning
talk show.150 In a 1974 statement that aimed to resolve whether the rules applied to sporting
events, the Commission made no real distinction between the CBS Evening News and Monday
Night Football, when it concluded that,
for purposes of its regulatory policies, the Commission believes it makes no difference whether broadcasts
of sports events are considered as news or entertainment. In either case, the Commission has consistently
held that it is the licensee's responsibility to refrain from engaging or permitting others to engage in
151
substantial deception of the public by deliberate falsification, distortion or suppression of facts.

However, the Commission’s pendulum now swings too far in the other direction, as it has
abruptly begun defining news much more narrowly in recent cases, offering no rationale for this
change. In the radio hoax cases in which the FCC revoked licenses it made little distinction
between statements that perpetuated the fake kidnappings, whether they were made in newscasts
or in disc jockeys’ ad-libs between songs.152 However, in a 1993 case, the FCC dismissed a
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complaint by a station’s news director about a sexual joke made about her by an announcer at a
rival station during a call-in segment of a morning program at her own station. The Commission
rejected the claim in part because it did not consider the morning, drive-time disc-jockey
program to be news.153 In the same year, the FCC rejected allegations of news suppression by
the Louisiana Consumers League against radio station KRMD, which cut short a live talk show
interview with a newspaper columnist who criticized car dealers’ trustworthiness and negotiating
tactics, after local car dealers who advertised on the station called to complain. KRMD
cancelled a planned taped interview with the columnist, and aired editorials accusing the
columnist of conducting business in a “dishonest or unethical manner” and maintaining that he
“unscrupulously used” the station.154 The Commission dismissed, stating flatly that the
distortion rules did not apply to the “non-news programming at issue in the present case.”155 In
these later decisions, the FCC has arbitrarily narrowed the scope of what it considers news.
RESPECTING NEWS, OR TRIVIALIZING IT?
To show that a regulation is symbolic also requires demonstrating that the Commission is
failing to meet its stated policy goals. The Commission has identified its overarching aims as
protecting the integrity of the political information upon which citizens rely to govern
themselves, and avoiding infringing on broadcasters’ legitimate news judgments in a way that
would chill controversial speech.156 However, as the FCC stretched the news distortion rules to
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cover a wide range of cases, most often dismissing them, it has suggested other goals as well in
the past. This section distinguishes those goals, and whether the Commission’s enforcement
record has fulfilled them.
The Commission has clearly established, and acted to defend, two aims. First, the FCC
has aimed to prevent licensees from using the news to promote contests deceptively, as in the
hoax cases. Second, the Commission has drawn on the distortion rules to try to block licensees
from using the news (as opposed to editorials) to promote a particular political candidate. Recall
that in Star Stations, the Commission found against licensee Don Burden because his station’s
“newscasts were used as a vehicle to publicize Burden’s preferred candidate – not as an exercise
of news judgment, but as a deception of the public and to further his private interests.”157 Yet it
is difficult to see Burden’s promotion of candidates as an act of deceiving the public, since the
ruling cited no evidence that the stations promised their audience to be neutral in these
campaigns. The decision makes more sense as a rejection of the licensee’s prerogative to use the
news to promote a chosen candidate, particularly, as in the Hartke Senate campaign, when the
candidate is touted in return for an anticipated benefit to the licensee’s business. Thus, the
Commission’s goals here seem closer to the political broadcasting rules, which attempt to
preserve candidates’ fair and equal access to the airwaves.158
The FCC has extended the distortion rules to other goals as well, although it has almost
never enforced them to serve these aims. These have to do with preventing broadcasters from
using their stations to serve their private interests, when they conflict with the public interest.
First, the FCC has applied the rules to try to curb licensees from entirely suppressing news of
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controversial people, subjects and events for fear of alienating segments of the public.159
However, it has not ruled against a broadcaster on such grounds.160 Second, the Commission has
also made it clear in a number of distortion cases brought by journalists against their employers
that licensees’ “refusal to broadcast material -- which otherwise would be broadcast -- because of
pressure from an advertiser is an obvious example of subordinating public to private interest.”161
Yet the Commission has not acted against a broadcaster for this reason either, typically
dismissing allegations that a licensee instructed reporters to cover promotional events created by
advertisers, or to kill stories adverse to them, as within the realm of the licensee’s news
judgment.162
Third, the Commission has attempted to prevent broadcasters from promoting or
suppressing news to serve their company’s direct business interests. Of course, all commercial
news is selected to attract an audience for a station’s advertisers, indirectly serving the licensee’s
business. However, the Commission has expressed its concern for bending the news to advance
a station’s or its parent company’s other commercial interests. In one of the contest hoax cases,
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the FCC declared itself more willing to discipline broadcasters for this type of speech, deeming it
less worthy of First Amendment protection. The FCC wrote
Where, as here, the danger is manipulation of the news to further the licensee’s business interests, rather
than manipulation of the news to create a biased or one-sided impression on public issues, there is less
163
potential for censorship and the Commission need not be as hesitant in imposing a sanction.

Yet, aside from the hoax cases and the blacked out tennis tournament in Gross Telecasting, the
Commission has not sanctioned a licensee for this offense in a distortion case. A divided
Commission cleared Chronicle Broadcasting of using the news to advance its cable and other
interests,164 and a similarly split ruling absolved WPIX of misrepresenting its news capabilities
by purporting to have a larger news staff, mislabeling film, and so forth.165 It is not surprising,
then, that the administrative law judge in Gross seemed to complain that “Commission case law
does not provide clear guidelines relative to the airing of news stories or the non-airing of such
stories which may directly relate to the owner of the broadcast facility or indirectly relate to its
advertisers.”166
Paradoxically, the Commission’s professed respect for news, and for licensees’ editorial
discretion, often restricts it from finding liability for all but the most trivial kinds of complaints.
The Commission has poured much investigative effort into finding licensees guilty of falsifying
weather temperatures and suppressing coverage of a tennis tournament. Despite the FCC’s
requirement that distortion concern a matter of significance to the public, the Commission has
most often used its ultimate penalty, license revocation, in cases involving contest-related news
about the whereabouts of disc jockeys. Although the public may have some interest in full and
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accurate news of weather, sports, and celebrities, these topics are hardly the lifeblood of active
citizenship and voting.
The FCC’s high burden of proof appears even less to serve the purported goals of the
news distortion rules when contrasted with its lower requirements for showing wrongdoing in
regard to less important programming. As National Public Radio (NPR) recently argued in an
indecency case, there is no need to show management intent or knowledge, or to show a pattern
of violations, in this area – “all that is necessary for a forfeiture to be issued for an indecent
broadcast is that the material was aired and the Commission found it to be indecent.”167 Nor
does the Commission refrain from being the “arbiter of the truth” in indecency cases when
resolving such thorny issues as the standards of the average viewer or listener, and whether a
broadcast violated them. As the FCC summarized NPR’s argument: “it is incongruous to have a
higher level of proof in news distortion cases than in indecency cases since the potential for
public harm is much greater in news distortion cases than in indecency cases.”168 If the FCC still
believes that “there is no act more harmful to the public's ability to handle its affairs”169 than
distorting news, the Commission seems more willing to investigate and punish representations of
indecent affairs than of public affairs. In addition, the FCC has held licensees more responsible
in cases involving false billing of advertisers,170 rigged contests,171 and stations preferentially

167

NPR Phoenix, 13 F.C.C.R. 14070, 14072 (1998).
Id.
169
Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
170
The dissenters in WPIX contrasted the Commission’s dismissal in this case with its
stronger reprisals for cheating advertisers in WDXB Broadcasting Co., 26 F.C.C.2d 1011 (1971)
(forfeiture); Wharton County Broadcasting Co., Inc. 25 F.C.C.2d 1029 (1970) (forfeiture);
Empire Broadcasting Corp. (KXXL), 63 F.C.C.2d 634 (1977) (short-term renewal and
forfeiture); WEAU, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 659 (1975) (short-term renewal and forfeiture); White
Mountain Broadcasting Co., 60 F.C.C.2d 343 (1976) (license renewal denied); and WLLE, 65
F.C.C.2d 774 (1977) (license revoked).
168

54

promoting their disc jockeys’ outside activities over competitors.172 In these areas, the FCC has
sometimes taken licenses for such offenses, even if licensees were unaware of violations, by
citing their failure to exercise adequate supervision of employees. It has been capable of doing
so because it has not employed the extrinsic evidence standard and burden of proof used in news
distortion cases.
REWRITING THE DISTORTION RULES
Symbolic regulations extend a deceptive promise to the public, in this case that the FCC
will act as a bulwark against deliberate distortion of the news. In this policy area, the
Commission has shown itself to be the proverbial dog that won’t hunt. Enforcement of the
distortion rules has been stymied by a lack of regulatory clarity and will. It has also been
blocked by licensees’ ability to assert their First Amendment rights above the public’s right to
honest news, and journalists’ right to report according to professional standards. Examining the
Commission’s existing rules reveals many flaws. FCC policy lacks clear definitions of the many
kinds of distortion mentioned in past decisions, and of news programming itself. It lacks a
consistent and reasonable evidentiary standard. It encourages the FCC to consider evidence of
wrongdoing in isolation rather than as a whole, and lacks guidance as to what would constitute a
pattern of distortion sufficient to trigger a sanction. The policy’s requirement that complainants
present extrinsic evidence of management intent erects an almost impossible standard of proof,
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putting the burden of proof entirely on complainants, yet offering no right of discovery. The
Commission has acted arbitrarily when deciding whether to infer intent to distort from the news
text, and whether a program even constitutes news.
In the absence of policy reform, potential complainants would be wise to avoid wasting
their resources on fruitless petitions to the FCC, and instead consider other strategies for
responding to such reports. Citizen groups, political figures and others might turn to tort
remedies and aggressive publicizing of distortions. Journalists forced to promote or suppress
reports to serve their employer’s politics or bottom line should take note of an investigative
reporter’s recent court victory, under appeal, against Fox station WTVT. The reporter argued
successfully that station management, fearful of libel threats from the drug company Monsanto,
fired her for refusing to include in a story the company’s false claims in defense of its bovine
growth hormone, which is injected in cows to increase milk production. The jury agreed that
station managers fired the journalist in retaliation for advising them that she planned to alert the
FCC that she was told to falsify her report, in violation of the news distortion rules. The plaintiff
sued under a state whistleblower law written to protect employees who give information about
their employer’s violation of federal law or regulation – probably the first time that the news
distortion policy has been used to protect journalists in this way.173
Nonetheless, the FCC must act to reinvigorate its news distortion policy, as alternative
remedies are insufficient. Whistleblower laws cannot compensate journalists unless they
sacrifice their jobs, and possibly their careers, to sue a news organization. Tort suits and
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effective public relations often require more resources than are possessed by citizen groups, local
political candidates and small businesses. Civil remedies also fail to directly vindicate the
public’s interest in honest journalism and the optimal use of the spectrum by the most qualified
licensees possible. The Commission could renew and revise its policy without trampling
broadcasters’ speech rights by exploring two broad avenues for reform.
First, the FCC should adjust its policy to the realities of today’s broadcast news
marketplace, in which news is clearly a for-profit enterprise that is less distinguishable from
commercial speech, and therefore deserves limited First Amendment protection.174 The
Commission could then borrow from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations on
deceptive advertising to reform its distortion rules. The FTC’s three-part definition of deceptive
advertising involves a) a representation, omission or practice likely to mislead a consumer who,
b) is acting reasonably under the circumstances, when c) the representation, omission or practice
is material to the deception.175 The FTC has applied its policy to a wide variety of practices and
texts aimed at drawing public attention to products, persons and organizations (including trading
stamps, freebies and product labels).176 Television news, although not mere advertising, is
indeed a free service offered to consumers for the purpose of attracting audiences for
advertisements. As this purpose has come to the fore, eclipsing its functions as providing
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political information or offering a public service in exchange for the privilege of using the
spectrum, it has become more analogous to the kind of speech regulated by the FTC.
Adapting the FTC standard to apply to news distortion (substituting a reasonable viewer
for the FTC’s reasonable consumer) would offer many advantages. The FTC’s three-part test for
deceptive ads would clarify the FCC’s definition of staging, falsification and deception in news.
It would streamline the handling of such cases and remove an undue burden on complainants by
eliminating the need to determine whether journalists or management intended to deceive
viewers.177 As the FTC does when assessing advertisements,178 the FCC would examine the
whole text when deciding whether a representation or practice is likely to mislead, rather than
considering evidence in isolation. The FCC could assess the full news report and the series of
which it is a part to determine what expectations of reality they create in a reasonable viewer and
whether those expectations were violated. This would be an improvement over the
Commission’s past arbitrariness in including or excluding whole genres of programming as
news. Like the FTC, the FCC would more often expect broadcasters to carry the burden of proof
that there is a reasonable basis in fact for their claims. 179 The FCC could adopt the FTC’s fairer
evidentiary standard as well, which may involve seek extrinsic evidence, but does not require
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it.180 The FTC’s rules give other businesses standing to bring complaints against deceptive ads,
because these rules are rooted in part in the recognition that deceptive advertising harms
competitors as well as consumers.181 Similarly, the FCC could consider extending standing to
broadcasters that are harmed when a competitor attracts audiences using deceptive practices,
such as were used in the WPIX case (presenting other organization’s reporters as their own,
claiming that old file film was current or delivered via satellite, and other attempts to create the
illusion of a superior news department.)182
The FCC could also follow the FTC in adopting a broader range of penalties than license
revocation, including issuing industry guides on permissible claims and practices, seeking
voluntary compliance, consent agreements, agency orders, demands for substantiation of claims,
corrective programming, injunctions and trade regulation rules. More choice of sanctions would
give the FCC the flexibility, and perhaps the courage, to act more often on instances of
distortion. The Commission could apply its fullest investigative activity and most potent
remedies for distortions that are material to audiences’ ability to function as citizens and
consumers (including consumers of news.) Coverage of sports and celebrities, which the
Commission has spent more energy probing in the past, would receive a lower priority.
The new standard and remedies could help the Commission address some of the current
ethical shortcomings of broadcast news that repeatedly make headlines despite broadcasters’
promises to correct themselves. For example, undisclosed or ambiguously presented
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reenactments, recreations and product tests have raised a good deal of concern among journalists
and commentators.183 The Commission needs to establish guidelines for disclosure of these
practices that are as clear as the FTC’s instructions for advertisements, and a range of penalties
appropriate to the harm done to citizens and consumers when they are violated.
However, the FTC standard cannot address many distortions that involve suppression or
promotion of news in the licensee’s private interest. When corporations censor their own
journalists, there is no news text to evaluate, and the public is left unaware of the practice. When
journalists select or are told to air stories that cross-promote a parent company’s products, there
may be no staging or falsification in the report. Nonetheless, both practices violate the
Commission’s ban on licensees subordinating the public interest in news to their private interest.
Thus, the second avenue of reform that the FCC should explore involves recommitting to
itself to a vigorous conflict of interest policy. Here, the Commission need not fear that it is being
overly intrusive into licensees’ editorial decisions if it restricts its inquiry to the question of
whether broadcasters substitute calculations based on their ideological or business interests for
their, or their journalists’, news judgment. In such cases, the FCC would not be evaluating
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whether the broadcaster’s news judgment is right or wrong, but whether the broadcaster used or
abandoned it.184 In thinking through this distinction, the Commission could begin with the
composite definition of editorial judgment that Randall Bezanson has elicited from a review of
recent state and federal case law. He finds the courts using three criteria oriented toward the
communicator’s purpose to determine whether his or her communication qualifies as editorial
judgment worthy of some level of First Amendment protection:
the choice of material (i) must concern information and opinion of current value to the public, or to an
undifferentiated audience of interested consumers of non-fictional current information; (ii) must be made
independently, oriented to the audience's needs as well as preferences; and (iii) must be grounded on a
judgment about the specific content being published. These three criteria aptly describe the paradigmatic
qualities of editorial judgments concerning "news" - decisions about public value and need for current
information, arrived at independently of government compulsion or coercion, advertiser dictate, or purely
self-interested motive. The criteria also effectively steer clear of judicial assessment of value or content . .
.185 (830)

Indeed, the Commission itself has forged some conflict of interest principles in past
rulings, although it does not appear to have enforced them of late. In cases involving “plugola”
(disc jockeys selecting and promoting recordings in which they have a financial interest) and
news commentary, the FCC has established expectations that broadcasters should investigate
potential conflicts of interest their employees may have, remedy them, or disclose them on air:
We expect licensees to exercise reasonable diligence to learn whether their employees or those with whom
they deal directly in connection with program matter have private financial interests in matters which may
affect the selection of program material. If such conflicts of interest exist, the licensee should insulate the
persons with such interests from the program selection process or, if this is impossible, exercise special
precautions to make sure that the public is not deceived as to the motivation for the broadcast of the
program matter.186
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See Randall P. Bezanson The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV.
754, 761 (1999) (“The Supreme Court has also implicitly recognized that expressive activities of
the press that are not the product of editorial judgment are not protected under the press
guarantee.”)
185
Id. at 830.
186
In the Matter of Termination of ‘Plugola’ Rulemaking and Affirmation of Disclosure
Requirement, 76 F.C.C.2d 227, 228-29 (1980). See also Crowell-Collier Broadcasting
Corporation, 14 FCC 2d 358-59 (1966).
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Specifically in regard to news, the FCC has written that when a broadcaster editorializes
on controversial issues in which it has a financial stake, it is obligated to “reveal to the broadcast
audience the extent and nature of its private interest.”187 The Commission has also established a
duty to disclose conflicts of interest in commentaries by a network journalist, the licensee’s
obligation to investigate such conflicts on the part of her or his employees, and to remedy
them.188 In addition, the Commission has fined a broadcaster that aired announcements
promoting commercial events staged by its management or employees for failing to disclose the
station’s financial sponsorship, failing to log the promotions as commercials, and gaining an
unfair competitive advantage over rival promoters by charging them regular advertising rates to
air similar messages.189
As media mergers and news sharing agreements entangle broadcast news departments in
larger webs of corporate ownership and alliances,190 the Commission should revise and enforce
its conflict of interest principles. The FCC could draw on them to address growing use of news
to cross-promote parent company media products191 and affiliated network programs.192 The
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Gross Telecasting, Inc., 14 FCC 2d 239-40 (1968) (finding that a station that
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disclosed its financial interest in the facility).
188
See National Broadcasting Co., 14 FCC 2d 713 (1968) (finding that network erred in
failing to stop its anchor-commentator from airing repeated commentaries favoring the interests
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See KISD, Inc., 22 FCC 2d 833 (1970).
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REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 72.
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See, e.g., Jenifer Glaser, Synergy Watch: Coming Distractions, COL. JOURNALISM
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 13 (discussing promotional stories about Disney films on Disneyowned ABC’s World News Sunday); John McManus, Is it News or an Ad?, available at
http://www.gradethenews.org/pagesfolder/Millionaire.html (discussing ABC-owned station’s
feature story on the release of a board game based on ABC’s Who Wants to be a Millionaire?
game show, including offering a web address where the game could be purchased, without
disclosing cross-ownership interest).
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Commission could resurrect its precedents in this area, but it would need to clarify its policy on
the unacceptable nature of various cross-promotions, and explicitly extend its concern for
disclosing and mitigating licensees’ conflicts of interest outside the narrow context of
editorializing. The FCC’s stated concern for undisclosed promotions as a form of unfair
competition should be applied to news programming designed to promote a licensee’s own
media holdings. The Commission should also act to curb suppression of news in the corporate
interest193 by restating and clarifying its ban on censoring news according to the licensee’s
business concerns and advertiser pressures.
As for journalists, the Commission should explore ways to enforce its requirement that
commentators (including pundits and investigative reporters) avoid or disclose financial interests
in the issues they cover, and that licensees address potential conflicts that arise. The FCC might
address the dubious “speaking fees” that many top journalists receive from industry actors whose
interests they cover on a regular basis (without disclosing these payments), appear to
compromise these reporters’ independence,194 and may already violate the Commission’s policy
that “the public is entitled to know by whom it is persuaded.”195
Even these revisions to the Commission’s policy will not address the larger ways in
which the agenda of commercial news can offer a distorted image of reality to viewers. For
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See, e.g., John Carman, Sunshine State and Strippers During Sweeps, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 5, 2000, at D1 (discussing NBC-affiliated station’s tie-in story on cruises following the
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example, these reforms cannot affect news’ tendency to over-represent crime and disasters.196
The larger failings of market-driven news, like the weather, are much remarked upon, but
generate little action. However, if the FCC devoted renewed attention to its distortion policy, it
would be one useful step toward restoring the public’s stake in what passes for news on the
airwaves.
Shortly after the Commission codified its distortion policy in the late 1960s,
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson saw that his colleagues were deploying it to protect licensees’
ability to censor the views of invited news sources and their own journalists. Concerned with the
wide scope of editorial discretion and the narrow band of accountability the FCC had created for
licensees, he wrote to his colleagues that “it is long past time for us to begin a general policy
review of the existing judicial precedent, past Commission decisions, and general
communications and First Amendment policies affecting cases like this.”197 Thirty years later,
he is still right.
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See Carole Kneeland, A Grueling Standard to Live By, Nieman Rep., Fall 1996, at 15
(noting that at the same time violent crime rates fell in the 1990s, coverage of it rose in television
news). See also Ray Surette, Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities 62-63
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address the larger issue of distorted news agendas. Rocky Mountain Media Watch based its
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The Commission rejected the petitions, dismissing the distortion complaint on grounds that the
group had not shown that any reports were staged or falsified, demonstrating the narrowness of
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FCC News Distortion Decisions, 1969-1999
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Table 1. Investigation and Success Rates, By Type of Complaint, 1969-1999
Type of Complaint

Slanting
Falsification
Staging
Deception

% of All Complaints

Investigation
Ratea

63.0 % (n = 97)
17.5 % (27)
14.3 % (22)
5.2 % (8)

41.2 % (n = 40)
59.3 % (16)
68.2 % (15)
50.0 % (4)

Total Complaints 100.0 % (154)c

Success
Rateb

5.2 % (n = 5)
3.7 % (1)
27.3 % (6)
12.5 % (1)

Mean 54.7 % (18.8) Mean 12.2 % (3.3)
Median 54.5 % (15.5) Median 8.9 % (3.0)

a

Represents the ratio of complaints by each type that the FCC investigated to complaints it did
not investigate (e.g., the ratio of complaints about slanting that the FCC investigated to
complaints about slanting that it did not investigate.)
b

Represents the ratio of complaints by each type that were successful to complaints that were
unsuccessful (e.g., the ratio of successful slanting claims to unsuccessful slanting claims.)
c

The number of complaints is higher than the number of total decisions reported in Figure 1
because some decisions involved multiple allegations (e.g., of slanting and staging).
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Table 2. Investigation and Success Rates, By Type of Complainant, 1969-1999
Type of Complainant

Public/Citizen Groups
Politicians/Candidates
FCC
Competing Applicants
Businesses
Journalists

% of All Complainants

52.0 % (n = 64)
20.3 % (25)
7.3 % (9)
7.3 % (9)
7.3 % (9)
5.7 % (7)

Total Complainants 99.9 % (123)c

Investigation
Ratea

Success
Rateb

34.4 % (n = 22)
36.0 % (9)
100.0 % (9)
42.9 % (5)
33.3 % (3)
85.7 % (6)

Mean 55.4 % (9)
Median 60.1 % (7)

1.6 % (n = 1)
4.0 % (1)
100.0 % (9)
22.2 % (2)
0.0 % (0)
0.0 % (0)

Mean 21.3 % (2.2)
Median 13.1 % (1.5)

a

Represents the ratio of complaints by each type of complainant that the FCC investigated to
complaints it did not investigate (e.g., the ratio of complaints made by businesses that the FCC
investigated to complaints by businesses that the FCC did not investigate.)
b

Represents the ratio of complaints by each type of complainant that were successful to
complaints that were unsuccessful (e.g., the ratio of successful complaints made by businesses to
unsuccessful complaints by businesses.)
c

The number of complainants is higher than the number of total decisions reported in Figure 1
because some decisions involved multiple complainants. Total does not equal 100.0 % because
of rounding.
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Table 3. Reasons Used by FCC to Dismiss Distortion Complaints, 1969-1999
Reasons

No Extrinsic Evidence
No Management Knowledge/Intent
Disconfirming Evidence
Licensee Discretion
Procedural Errors
Insufficient Evidence
None
Total Reasons

% of All Reasons

45.6 % (n = 73)
14.4 % (23)
13.8 % (22)
10.0 % (16)
7.5 % (12)
5.0 % (8)
3.7 % (6)
100.0 % (160)a

a

The number of reasons is higher than the number of total decisions reported in Figure 1 because
some decisions cited multiple reasons for dismissal.
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